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Abstract: The study of institutions and economic history was much influenced
by Ronald Coase and Douglass North, in particular with Douglas North’s
notion of government as an endogenous outcome of institution competition.
Although Max Weber articulated a concept of government as a monopoly of
violence in 1919, much subsequent modeling work on governments was built
around the banditry notion of governments of Mancur Olson (1993,
“Democracy, Dictatorship and Development.” The American Political Science
Review 87(3) (September): 567–576). Examples are Usher (1989, “The Dynastic
Cycle and the Stationary State.” American Economic Review 79: 1031–1044),
Moselle and Polak (2001, “A Model of a Predatory State.” Journal of Law,
Economics & Organization 17(N1)), and the like. A good summary is found in
Dixit (2004, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). We called this collectively a
Weberian/Olsonian view of governments. Building on the notion that a State
is a monopoly of violence, these models are in line with the banditry idea of
Olson, which, among many country historical studies, he used the Chinese
example that governments are essentially stationary/roving bandits. Taking
Olson’s ideas as a lead, this paper uses the counter-example of Feng Yu-hsiang
(馮玉祥 1882–1948) (Feng), a Chinese “warlord”, to present an alternative
analytical framework in terms of a supply-demand model for the emergence
of governments. The level of generalization for a framework of such societal
order is necessarily heuristic, and can be compared to such economic simpli-
fication of social reality by Hayek, Schumpeter and North. However, it should
help constellate facts that can be gathered to evaluate refutable hypotheses
that are of interest to political theorists and historians. The model formulated
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for this paper is not intended to justify violence, which the authors deplore,
but is recognized as merely a statement about realpolitik.
Keywords: government, history
1 Introduction
This paper evolved when the first author was a Ph.D. student of Steven
N.S. Cheung at the University of Washington. Douglass North was a member
of his thesis committee and the Chair of the Economics Department when he
graduated in 1978. The paper has gone through numerous revisions, with the
co-authors making substantive contributions in changing directions for the
paper over the years. Under his supervision, the second post-graduate disserta-
tion of the third author, on adversarial politics (Lai 1987), benefited from a 1983
version.
The late Mancur Olson, in a very interesting paper (1993), offered the view
that governments are basically stationary bandits with an expertise in taxation,
which is acquiesced to by their people who prefer them to roving bandits. He
called that “the first blessing of the invisible hand” (p. 568). To illustrate his
idea, he used examples of Feng, versus a roving bandit, White Wolf, who was
alleged to be suppressed by Feng. Olson disputed the contractarian views of the
state developed by Barzel (1991, 1992, 2002), Barzel and Edgar (1991), Kiser and
Barzel (1991), North (1981, 1990), and North and Thomas (1973).
Olson’s idea is interesting, but the example he used was unfortunately
ahistorical. Feng did not suppress White Wolf when Feng was a warlord.1 Nor
was he able to tax a lot because he did not have time to hold onto certain
places for a long time. Indeed, the entire period of “warlords” in China was
short-lived and lasted only from 1916 to 1930, unless we regard the Nationalist
(KMT) and Communists ALSO as warlords! There were many examples of
warlords who not only roved and robbed, but used tax funds to invest in
the territories they controlled.
1 Feng Yu-Hsiang’s name is sometimes spelled Feng Yu-Hsing. See Feng (2002): Ch. 17,
pp. 134–143). According to Feng, during a battle with White Wolf, his troops expended
200,000 rounds of ammunition, but only inflicted 200 casualties. The White Wolf battles
were fought in 1914 (Sheridan, pp. 50–51), which was several years before Feng became a
warlord. The battles with bandits were fought in Honan with Red Spear, when Feng was a
warlord, rather than with White Wolf (Sheridan, p. 91, pp. 114–115).
2 B. T. Yu et al.
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But the point to note is that no warlord has ever come out of the blue as a
man on horseback by himself. A closer analysis of the typical warlord shows
that he was the outcome of public choice in many respects other than his
ability to organise violence, a Weberian view of government. A typical warlord
in Northern China was a general in the Northern Army of Imperial China, led
by Yuan Shikai, who had a political agenda to sell to prospective subjects,
hopefully all over China, after the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty. Yuan
apparently believed that once he was in control of Peking, the seat of the
Chinese Government would be recognised by the Western Powers, and once he
called himself the true President of China, everyone in China would treat him
as the real president. As it turned out, he had to step down or retreat in light of
the demonstrations and outcries spread by the newspapers and dissension
within his own military, not to mention the military fortunes of the competing
Canton Government. Canton itself was the prize for the southern warlords and
those factions of the republicans who helped Yuan overthrow the Manchu
Dynasty.
The soldiers who supported the warlord could surely be seen as the latter’s
assets, but also as his liabilities. They were often imperial soldiers recruited from
the same province,2 and hence, the general had a moral responsibility to take
care of them. If he did not, then he would soon lose his power base. The
question of the unification of China was thus not just a matter of the ability of
armed groups to impose their rule by force, but, more profoundly, a choice made
by buyers of a concept introduced in this paper as organized violence in hopes
of gaining a better protected life, rather than gaining protection from violence
per se.
Many great nations in history were built up by a process of roving, which
was more than just looting. Abraham’s tribe roved through several places in the
Middle East until they settled in Canaan. The roving of Alexander the Great and
the Turks, which left the Hellenistic states and the Ottoman Empire, respectively,
are also classic examples. In Chinese History, many successful and less success-
ful dynasties began their lives as armed, roving organizations. Good examples
are the Kingdom of Shu during the period of the Three Kingdoms; the Tsui
Dynasty, which built the Grand Canal; and various, anonymous ancient Silk
2 Warlord Feng, like Wu Pei-fu, had his base in Zhili Province (Zhili refers to parts of today’s
Hebei, Henan, and Shantung (Shangdong) Provinces as well as the cities of Peking (Beijing) and
Tientsin (Tianjin)). Yen Hsi-shan’s home base was Shensi (Shanxi) Province, Pai Chung-hi’s was
in Kwangsi (Guangxi) Province, and Chang Tso-lin’s was in Manchuria.
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Road developers. The main contenders for the seat of Modern China, the KMT
and the Communists, were also rovers. The former roved north from Canton with
the latter. After the two split up, the Communists continued to rove until they
conquered all of China by 1949. The KMT, which probably roved less than the
Communists, took flight to Taiwan. While roving per se does not build a state, a
government that has no roving ability can hardly expand a state.
It is from this backdrop that we offer this framework of analysis with the
roving of bandits only as a background, but with an added assumption that
choices can be made at the individual level, or, via the mobility of all players,
include bandits. Our purpose is to enrich the contractarian understanding of
democracy as a specific mode of organising violence to better protect individuals
and property rights. The story of Feng turns out to be illustrative in highlighting
a key ingredient in this process that Olson overlooked in his analysis.
2 Understanding government as “organized
violence”
Around the time Olson wrote about governments as stationary bandits, there
was much work being done on the modeling of the different angles of govern-
ment as an executor of violence. Hirshleifer (1995, 2001) modeled attack and
defense technologies without explicitly assuming that governments are bandits.
The setting he used in his model, which Dixit (2004) succinctly summarized,
typically assumed the existence of a predator (attacker) and prey (defender).
Hirshleifer placed emphasis on examining the equilibrium conditions that deter-
mined the amount of resources the offense and defense expended when they
were away from their production activities. Multiple equilibria were possible, but
with complete specialization as a corner solution, while equilibria that involved
pure predation and pure production were perhaps special cases. The focus of
attention was on conflicts and appropriation. Each model has its own special
feature highlighted. For example, Whittman (2000) adopted a nations-mutually-
expropriating model, which pointed out that violence can be used as a threat
rather than a means for execution. Moselle and Polak (2001), building on the
work of Usher, pointed out that primitive states emerging from banditry can
result in lower levels of output and welfare.
The framework we will display in this paper differs from the modeling
angles in the above literature in terms of the views towards violence, as well
as the nature of the protection market in reaching equilibriums. We found that
the traditional model of supply and demand, which economists have commonly
4 B. T. Yu et al.
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used for analyzing market activities, can be easily modified to be equally
applicable in the market for violence. It may be more useful to view a problem
from the supply and demand angle of the problem if a contractarian viewpoint is
to be pursued, as specialization and the gain from trade arising from exchanges
of individuals are at the heart of supply and demand. Also, there can be insights
that can be directly borrowed from market economics to be applied to the
market for protection. Indeed, the market structure of violence can act as a
useful categorizing tool for determining the various forms of government, which
are various degrees of “organized violence”.3 The model categorizes players
during the emergence of governments through an evolving market structure of
protection, rather than through roving and stationary bandits. An illustrative
model that spells out the assumptions used is described in the Appendix. Here,
we summarize the assumptions and qualitatively describe the nature of various
equilibria, which are interpreted as institutions entailing various degrees of
organized violence.
Let’s start with a demand and a supply of protection,
A. On the demand side: We hypothesized that all individuals demand protection of some
sort, whether through self-defence, adequate shelter and circumstances, the contracting
out of a service of protection and the execution of violence, the organization of a produc-
tion function of violence, or simply adopting a faith in the spiritual protection of various
divine forces. All individuals need security and protection of some sort.
The basic incentive to exchange goods and services for protection is inherent in
the fact that people are not identical. Their preferences for and their abilities to
engage in violence vary. Contracts for protection lead to specializations for those
who have a comparative advantage in executing violence. They are the violence
3 The Weberian/Olsonian view of government has many variations. Moselle and Polak (2001)
also attempted a similar classification, but used a different set of terminologies involving
anarchy (the state of nature), organized banditry (groups of raiders), and the primitive state
(minimal organization, like a “King”), p. 2. It is not the purpose of this paper to make compar-
isons between our notion of organized violence and that by Moselle and Polak. Categorization is
a matter of subjective choice. Moselle and Polak cited the famous work of Wittfogel’s oriental
despotism in support of their main conclusion. That might be true for ancient China, but the
story of Feng happened in the context of Modern China, notably with the founding of the
Republic of China in 1912, which made a difference. In that sense, Usher (1989), on whose work
Moselle and Polak based their study, was also inadequate as a source for discussing Modern
China’s political and economic problems, as innovations that affected the market structure of
protection were explicitly ruled out in the formulation. The notion of organized violence that we
wish to highlight in this paper include the important element of innovation and could be used
in a discussion on the political economy in other countries as well. However, we shall look at
this through the lens of modern China in this paper only.
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specialists4 who exist not because of they are threatened for survival, but
because they are skilful in executing violence – and perhaps enjoy doing so,
just as professional basketball players enjoy playing basketball.
B. On the supply side: We invited a deeper examination of the nature of violence that went
beyond the categorization of roving and stationary bandits, attackers, and defenders. The
perspective of violence used here can be found in the Art of War by Sun Tzu. Among the
many techniques discussed in this Chinese classic, there is one that is particularly relevant
to the topic of discussion here: attack can be used as defense, and defense can be used as
attack. A warrior combines offensive and defensive strategies to win a war. American
football dichotomizes the game into offense and defense; a defense rarely becomes an
offense except when mistakes are committed by the offense. Most contests in the world
have fluidity and flexibility so that offensive and defensive maneuvers can be executed at
the same time. We categorically grouped bandits, protectors, attackers, defenders, orga-
nized criminals, and the military as executors of violence.5
There are various market structures that can evolve from a basic specification of
the demand and cost functions of protection. The emphasis of this paper is on
governments as alternative market structures of protection. The evolution of a
market structure is almost the same everywhere. Generally, there will be a
competitive market of protection that resembles a perfectly competitive market.
This market structure is only a little more efficient than a complete autarky
where no protection contracts of any type are enforced. Every individual expro-
priates others, or at least needs to self-defend against expropriation. A perfectly
competitive market is one in which there are some degrees of specialization of
violence execution, but the nature of the contract for protection is quid pro quo,
4 Contrast this with the Hirshleifer and the Dixit models, in which every individual is assumed
to allocate resources to violence, and thus, a market structure for anarchy becomes the intrinsic
characteristic of the outcome of those models.
5 This conflict technology assumption is vastly different from what the literature cited has
emphasized. To us, the ability to inflict damage lies in an attacker’s technology relative to the
defensive ability of the target. Bows and arrows cannot possibly tear down a stone castle and
shields are useful only against certain weapons. Regardless of weapons technology, the cost of
serving a particular subject under protection is different from the cost of protection to fight off
potential attackers or enemies. The cost of providing protection, unlike that of providing
consumer goods and services to satisfy the preferences of the buyers, is structured to serve
the weapons preferences of the attackers and very much depends on their propensity for
violence. It is true that a wealthy and more mobile individual is more costly to protect than a
low value immobile object, but whatever resources a violence specialist expends while fighting,
they are not directly consumed by a buyer in the sense that a buyer consumes bread when s/he
buys it from a bakery. The benefit received by those under protection comes indirectly – only
when their protectors win the war or when the attackers refrain from continuing their attack.
This assumption is important to understanding the way the protection cost function is specified.
6 B. T. Yu et al.
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defined on the spot, and exists for a period of time implicitly defined. A subject
will be protected by Supplier 1 in one period, and depending on the circum-
stances, be protected by Supplier 2 in the next period. The degree of safety under
the protection plan of A is identical to the protection plan of B by assumption of
identical suppliers of protection. Under assumptions described in the appendix,
a spot market of protection resembles a perfectly competitive market, as
described in the diagram below:
D is the aggregate demand for protection in a society consisting of N number
of individuals wanting protection and Z number of protectors. D comes from an
arrangement of one’s willingness to pay for protection (as specified as WTPij*
from eq. [1] in the appendix, with j* being the j protector chosen at equilibrium)
in descending order. The marginal cost and total average cost of Protector 1 is
specified as MC1 and ATC1, with that of Protector 2 defined correspondingly (but
not labelled explicitly) with
PZ
j = 1
MCj being the aggregate market supply. X1 is the
number of individuals protected by Protector 1. N* is the total number of people
under protection by Z protectors. The equilibrium protection fee is P*.6
We believe this model of protection can be more illustrative for describing
the warlord era in Modern China than Olson’s framework of roving and station-
ary bandits. Although the logic of Olson’s argument has features that resemble
the protection market described here, he avoided pursing the argument on this
platform.7 He was more interested in the results of “stationary banditry over
anarchy” (p. 569) in that democracy can evolve as the market structure changes.
Our study of the history in China suggested that territorial dominance by
warlords, particularly those under the control of Feng, was rather fluid and
changed from year to year. Feng did not stay long at one place. Moreover, as we
will show later, the nature of competition in China at the time went beyond the
static condition of the spot market of protection as described above. So Figure 1
is just the starting point. Before we conceptually describe this evolutionary
process, let us first summarize some features of the warlord period in early
twentieth century China to provide a backdrop.
6 Strictly speaking, the demand for protection ends at P* as unprotected individuals will either
be expropriated and thus that portion of the demand no longer exists, or become bandits
themselves. Realistically, individuals at the lower portion of the demand curve are either too
poor to be robbed, or they won’t care about being robbed. We leave the demand curve as drawn
to exaggerate the similarity between this and market demand for goods and services.
7 The closest he came to a perfect competitive market of protection as described here is in a
statement that “a dispersion of power and resources over a large area can result in a set of small
scale autocracies but no democracy,” p. 573.
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3 Warlords period in China
A large volume of literature documenting the warlord period in China exists. To
reiterate, this period occurred between the fall of the Manchu Dynasty and the
emergence of the loose alliance between the KMT and the CCP.8 Aside from
Sheridan’s study, on which Olson’s thesis was based, we used several Chinese
references.9 The following features can be broadly summarized:
3.1 Income sources
The warlords formally received their income from several sources: by stealing
tax income (on land and salt) that should have gone to the Northern Government
Figure 1: A perfect competitive market of protection.
8 KMT, found by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen in 1912 was the first Republic of China (ROC), now based in
Taiwan. The Red Army, under Mao Tse-tung and others, formed a Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) which led to the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), now the Beijing
Government.
9 Pao, Lee and Ng (1956–1959), Lim (1994), Chang (1997), Feng (2002), Wong (2006), Chang
(2007), and several other Chinese articles on the internet.
8 B. T. Yu et al.
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of the Republic of China, expropriating income from railways they controlled,
obtaining loans from banks backed by foreign interests, borrowing from foreign
governments, and printing money. The Central Government received residual
income not kept by the warlords, customs collected by foreign powers, and
loans from foreign governments. Its budget was always in the red – an important
factor that probably contributed to its downfall.
3.2 Economic consequences
Historians tend to agree that the economic impact of the warlords was, as a whole,
negative except perhaps for a certain period during the reign of Chang Tso-lin in
Manchuria, where rapid industrialisation took place. Tax rates and military expen-
ditures generally increased over time,10 suggesting a situation of rent dissipation,
resulting in MC and ATC of protection for all protectors shifting higher, in the
context of the graphical explanations surrounding Figure 1. Table 1 shows that of
the four provinces surveyed, three witnessed growth in military expenditures from
1919 to 1925. Table 2 shows that the additional tax levied on land to finance the
military expenditures of warlords varied from province to province and from year
to year, but generally grew from 1912 to 1933. Although there was no correspond-
ing growth in representative democracy, there was a gradual change in the market
structure of protection starting at around 1912.11 (This is a point we will further
note after displaying the full evolutionary market structure of the protection
framework, as illustrated in the appendix.)




























Source: Chang (1997, p. 206), (Chinese publication).
10 See Chang (1997).
11 Nineteen twelve is the first year of the Republic of China, which was founded by Dr. Sun
Yat-sen. Warlords were rampant during the early years of the Republic.
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3.3 The mobility of warlords
Other than Chang Tso-lin and Yen Hsi-shan, warlords tended to be quite mobile,
as their territorial ambitions and zones shifted, expanded, and contracted as a
result of politics (amalgamation and dissension) and war in a typical
Machiavellian manner. Their activities were sometimes coloured by elements
of romanticism and religion: for example, there were the so-called “Christian”
(Feng)12; “Buddhist” (Tong); and “Muslim” (Bei) Generals. Before the Canton-
based KMT started the Northern Expedition in an attempt to subdue the various
generals, warlords were also sporadically supported by different foreign inter-
ests: Soviet, American, British, French, and Japanese.
Whether warlords roved or remained stationary, they have been called
“bandits” from a western perspective. In a book describing Christian missionary
services in China around the turn of the twentieth century, the influence of the
warlords was evident.13 As we will argue in later sections, the characteristics of
Table 2: Supplementary land taxes imposed by warlords on top of the central government’s
land tax.
Province    
Hupei +% +% +% +%
Hunan +% +% +% +%
Shansi +% +% +% +%
(Shanxi)
Kiangsu +% +% +% +%
(Jiangsu)
Wupei +% +% +% +%
(Hubei)
Xichuan +% +% +% +%
(Sichuan)
Kwangtung +% +% +% +%
(Guangdong)
Yunnan +% +% +% +%
Note: Lim (1994 translated, p. 231). Central government land tax= 100%.
12 According Fairbank (1986, p. 181). Feng was baptized in 1913 by Rev. John R. Mott; but
according to Sheridan (1966, p. 53), he was baptized in 1914 by Liu Fang of the Methodist
Episcopal Church. Sheridan also discussed Feng’s motivation to become a Christian.
13 Wong Sik Pui, author of Sacrificial Love – Portraits of CIM Missionaries (a book written in
Chinese), studied past issues of China’s Millions (English journal) of China Inland Mission in his
compilation of a record of foreign missionaries in China. Wong pointed out that the journal
constantly referred to “bandits” in China at that time. To Wong, the account of the warlord era
10 B. T. Yu et al.
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these bandits were not whether they roved or not, but their ability to win a quid-
pro-quo protection contract from ordinary citizens.
There were more than 200 “bemedaled generals” during the warlord years
(1916–1930) in China.14 But, according to Taiwan’s account of the Northern
Expedition, which was an important transition during the early stage of the
Republic of China, the “important” warlords mentioned were only four – Wu
Pei-Fu, Suen Chuen-Fong, Chang Tso-Lin, and Tuan Chi-jui (Pao, Lee, and Ng,
pp. 158–160). Feng was not listed in these overview paragraphs. In an account
written by a Mainland Chinese writer, Chang (2007), Feng was working as a
backup to Wu Pei-Fu as early as 1922. He was appointed by the Northern
Government in Beijing (Peking) to be the Governor of Henan, and his accom-
plishments in Henan aroused Wu’s jealousy.15 Pao, Lee, and Ng wrote that Feng
worked under Tuan.
With the highlighted backdrop of the warlord period in China, Feng did not
appear to be a military bully or a local thug of the type suitable for the term
“stationary bandit,” but more of an agent and executor of violence for others,
irrespective of whether his principals were legitimate or illegitimate govern-
ments. This was particularly so during his battle with White Wolf in 1914. He
was under the command of Lu Chien-Chang, the commander of the 7th Division
under Yuan Shikai, who headed the Peking Government at the time. Feng’s
“victory” over White Wolf did not result in him staying put either, except later
when delegated by his superior to remain at Changde, where he stayed for no
more than two years. In fact, Feng’s army was nicknamed the “Flying Army”
(noted by Katsuji Fuse in Sheridan, p. 51) in reference to its quick mobility.
Feng also did not evolve into “grasping hand” (in the model language of
Olson, p. 569). Indeed, he always worried about financing his army, as revealed
in his autobiography. The following account of Feng by Sheridan hardly fits the
image of a wealthy warlord:
reported in China’s Millions were more “objective,” as it was reported from the perspective of
grassroots individuals, rather than from the official points of view of Taiwan or the PRC
(interview conducted on Mar 12, 2007, Seattle). Wong also cross-referenced official Chinese
language history books.
14 Fairbank (1986, p. 181).
15 Fighting between warlords during this period conformed well to the competitive market of
protection described in the theoretical model in this paper. For example, in 1924, while Wu was
fighting Chang in the North, Feng marched to Beijing, forcing an incumbent warlord (Tsao) out,
and thereby opened the door to let Tuan march in. Fighting during this period stretched from
Laoning (Liaoning), Inner Mongolia, to Hopei (Hebei), Shantung (Shangdong), Kiangsu
(Jiangsu), Anhui, Honan (Henan), and Shansi (Shanxi). Chiang was based in Canton. It was
in this environment that Sun Yat-sen died on March 12, 1925 in Beijing.
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…Feng’s most serious difficulties while in Hsinyang [in 1921] concerned finances. He did
not hold any local or regional office in Honan, and therefore had no handy source of
revenue… Feng had trouble even providing a sufficient diet for his men… Feng turned into
banditry… Learning that a train was to pass through Hsinyang carrying…[Peking] govern-
ment revenue, Feng simply had his troops stop the train and seize the money (p. 100).
If there was an example of a stationary bandit during the warlord period, Feng
was not that person. Indeed, his career helped illustrate a framework beyond what
Olson had depicted – one that starts with a spot market of protection as depicted
in Figure 1. Yet, that is not the final story. It is the evolutionary market structure of
protection that Feng’s army has particularly evolved to transpire. We now turn to
this concept to bring in a dynamic evolvement of a protection market.
4 Evolutionary market structure of protection
The competitive spot market of protection will not last too long, just like
atomistic competition in a product market will not last because of technological
changes. The driving force, other than new technology, could be a specific
strategy chosen by entrepreneurial firms (which may start out small). Built
into the framework of the supply condition of protection, as illustrated in the
appendix, are the innovative shift parameters of αj, which affect the public
goods offered by protector j, and γj, affects the technology of the execution of
violence by j. The parameters can be turned into choice variables chosen by
protector j in a multi-period long term competitive process.
The precise trajectory of this evolutionary process is extremely difficult to
model. The lead author of this paper discussed the intuition of a particular
outcome in the context of prior contracting for innovation (1981).16 Modelling
16 The idea drew upon the concept contained in Competition for the Market by McNulty (1968) and
Demsetz (1968). Both authors questioned the usefulness of the conventional concept of perfect
competition, especially in situations when there are scale economies, where marginal costs are
falling, and average total costs are higher than marginal costs. Yu (1981) proposed that competition
in this context may take the form of competition in contractual and institutional forms, suggesting
that a term, prior contracting, be used to replace most economists’ familiar price-taker framework to
analyse this class of problems. See also Barzel (1994) in this elaboration in a general context of
property rights, Masahiko Aoki (2001), who independently worked on scale economies, developed a
direction of inquiry that concentrated on institutional choices. It resulted in a broad area of analytical
thinking known as Comparative Institutional Analysis. The relationship between this area of inquiry
and that in constitutional political economics, initiated by the cumulative works of James Buchanan,
is the notion of a constitutional balance budget, in which tax revenues are constitutionally con-
strained to cover only expenses, which is the outcome of a benevolent dictator.
12 B. T. Yu et al.
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work in this direction has been virtually non-existent in the literature. Yet, in
view of advances in the digital frontier towards the end of last century and
continuing into this century, the evolutionary trajectory of high tech firms, such
as Microsoft and Apple, followed a pattern that was not too far from the concept
described in that paper. The trajectory of Microsoft has certainly been different
from that of Apple, and at this point, no oligopoly theory that we are aware of
can adequately model the behaviour these two companies. As for the political
economy problem on hand that is relevant to this paper, Usher (1989) noted the
difficulty of modelling transition (p. 1042) even without considering technical
changes. He, however, provided a suggestion on how to think about the
problem:
A rudimentary model of the transition from anarchy to despotism might be based on the
postulate that randomly chosen gangs of bandits fight and then coalesce, the winners
occupying the senior positions in the new, larger gang and the losers occupying the
inferior positions. Such a process would lead in time from an initial condition in which
each person is his own gang to a single-unified nationwide hierarchy. The model would not
be particularly instructive. For an understanding of the emergence of despotism, one would
do better to turn to history or fiction (Note 7, emphasis ours).
Usher used China as an example in the setup of his model of dynastic cycles,
which, in terms of its inspirational source, was similar to Olson’s model. But
Usher treated banditry as an external constraint for a ruler, while Olson viewed
all rulers and robbers as bandits. Neither author saw technical changes to be the
driving force of their models. That is odd, as the subject matter dealt with
problems for a time period as long as a dynasty, aiming to derive powerful
propositions resembling Adam Smith’s famous “invisible hand” (see Olson’s
First Blessing of the Invisible Hand [1993, p. 568]).17 Both Usher and Olson
were top notched economists whose thinking inspired economists and political
scientists alike. Yet, over the question of how a state or dynasty evolved, the two
could not agree. Olson thought that the concept of a predatory state is mislead-
ing, even for autocracies (p. 569), as tyrants and dictators all produce public
goods of some type. He therefore focused on stationarity vs. roving being the
deciding factor, not predator vs. prey.
17 Olson did not provide a model in his paper, but mentioned an “invisible” model in a
footnote that is available on request (Note 9, p. 575). Yet, if there is anything “invisible”
about the process, it is a contract for specializing in the violence that is mentioned in the
formulation of the demand curve in earlier sections of this paper. These contracts, which are
quid-pro-quos for violence, can lead an individual’s allocation of resources between the
production and execution of violence to a corner solution.
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In our opinion, the evolutionary process of governments is better studied
through examples than by modelling. We echoed Usher’s methodological sug-
gestion to offer additional facts concerning the country (China) that Usher and
Olson were interested in analysing. However, we found that the framework
offered by the two scholars was not entirely applicable to Modern China.
Again, we believe that the shift parameters in αj and γj are crucial in generating
contracts that can be solidified into institutions. Successive processes of con-
tracting lead to higher orders of violence in the form of centralized governments,
which aim to be benevolent, but can certainly degenerate into despots. This
process has often been overlooked in the literature, but it is one that we believe
is closer to the truth, at least in the modern Chinese context played out by Feng.
With the above caveats in mind, let us delve into the possible trajectory
further: the intuition of an adjustment process in Usher’s footnote quoted above
is illuminating and straightforward, but there is an added public goods aspect,
as well as a contractual process to be interplayed together with this adjustment.
Both Usher and Olson saw history as being primarily determined by a conflict of
interactions between bandits and rulers. Peasants have no say in this process
unless they themselves become bandits. Until they enter the political arena of
conflict competition, they are simply fish in the ocean waiting to be caught.18 On
the other hand, the institutional approach, as suggested by the notion of prior
contracting, believes that peasants do have a say in the whole evolutionary
process because individual choices matter.
The point needs further elaboration. If individuals under protection, includ-
ing soldiers working for a ruler or a bandit, are committed to the whole ruling
package offered by any competitive protector, this can change the dynamics of
the process in reaching an equilibrium without a despotic outcome being the
sole consequence. Indeed, it could be argued that, if there is a stationary
component to the analysis of the emergence of a government, it is the peasants,
the individuals under protection, that will evolve to become stationary19 as a
commitment to the public goods of protection offered by protector j. There
should not be any presumption, in theory or in practice, that stationarity will
come about necessarily on the part of the ruler or the bandit. Solicitation of
18 Usher pointed out the complete lack of cooperation between farmers and bandits in his
model, p. 1044. In his conclusion, he suggested that relaxing this assumption would be “a
necessary, though not sufficient, condition, for the development of a more humane society,
[but] a matter well beyond the scope of this paper.”
19 The term “stationary” means different things in different papers. In Usher, it refers to time.
In Olson, it refers to location. Here, it refers to commitment. Generally interpreted, the commit-
ment could be on investment on land and properties that are not easily movable, e. g. instead of
living in tents, people invest in building stone houses.
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commitment and lock-in (loyalty) becomes the gist of the competition for the
market of protection. Again, the ubiquitous pricing strategies of digital/internet
companies that we see during this and the last century in solidifying their
respective client bases via long term commitments rather than spot contracting
suggest that the notion of prior contracting is not a fairy tale. The argument for
applying this to the political market of protection is similar.
In the context of competition for the market of protection, the dynamic process
involves simultaneous adjustments in public goods, military technology, and the
civil administrative process. The model in the appendix does not prove that this
entrepreneurial strategy will necessarily succeed in transforming a market from
atomism to an oligopoly; and from there, whether a ruling package that results in a
monopoly (a single supplier of protection) will necessarily be the case. However, it
outlines the parameters of choice for this evolutionary market structure game. An
individual protector may do a little more of one thing in the ruling/protection
package than another, but any offering of protection package has to be considered
as awhole. That iswhat ourmodel is saying: individuals under protection, or groups
considering coalescence have to consider the net benefits they get out of paying Pj,
for the services of all components in the package, including violence (in the form of
either offence or defence), which some protectors would call “national defence”.
The above statement seems trivial, but its implications can be subtle. At the
heart of the evolutionary process, which is described as a centralized democracy
in the appendix, are individuals or groups of individuals successively giving up
their rights to execute violence in exchange for protection by others. Centralised
democracy here refers to democracy that succeeds in enabling the development
of a lower set of long run costs of protection for property and human rights which
does not preclude adversarial politics. This is what we call a higher form of
organized violence – protectors offering protections in lower forms can subscribe
to protection from others in higher forms. It was this, and not only a defeat of the
enemy’s war-making capacity, that competition between KMT and the emerging
(and ultimately winning) Red Army in Modern China was about. In other words,
the essence of competition here is not just competing to defeat one’s enemies, but
competing to obtain a quid-pro-quo process involving renouncing violence from
the peasant level to the bandit level, from the bandit level to the warlord level,
and from the warlord level to the revolutionary level. This successive quid-pro-
quo process will lead to what can be called a centralized democracy.
The following diagram describes the concept of centralized democracy
graphically and compares it with the equilibria and the transitional processes
envisioned by Usher and Olson.
The diagram was not drawn on the same scale as that in Figure 1. Point A
on the demand curve in Figure 2 is used as a starting point of reference, with P*
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and N* being the perfect competitive (but rent dissipating) market equilibrium
depicted in Figure 1. Technological changes lower total fixed costs and variable
costs of firms in the industry and, through a process of competition (described in
the appendix), result in a scale economies cost structure of protection, as
denoted by AC and MC (note the downward sloping properties of AC and MC
for this diagram). That the power of protection can be centralized does not imply
that a monopoly price is charged (equilibrium O in the diagram with protection
fee at Po and individuals under protection at No). This, however, is the dynastic
equilibrium conjectured by Usher, and thus, the idea of a predatory state with
monopoly rent indicated by the dotted area. The dynastic cycle of Usher exam-
ined the conditions needed for equilibria O and A to oscillate.
Olson implicitly argued that a stationary bandit will turn A into an autocracy.
He saw the “grasping hand” as a transitional process (pp. 569–570) implying a
monopoly rent, which was also depicted by equilibrium O. However, Olson
examined the mechanisms in which an autocracy can voluntarily turn into a
democracy. He conjectured that the provision of local public goods have a lot to
do with that. This aspect of his thinking shared a similarity to our approach and
can also be phrased in terms of the above diagram in that local public goods
are captured in the variable cost component of protection and the innovation
shift factor can make the MC lower and falling (i. e., capable of attracting more
clients in light of growing demand). Thus, the trajectory implicit in Olson’s
argument, in the context of the model described here, starts from equilibrium
A by being stationary. The description of that trajectory has a bandit evolving
Figure 2: Alternative market structures of protection.
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from A to O. Then, by being benevolent, the equilibrium will evolve to M. Olson
was not concerned about M reversing into A, and so did not share the same
dynastic cycle problem that Usher had wished to examine.
The framework described in this paper starts with A as well, but we envision a
process of achieving M without first going through equilibrium O. The competitive
process can allow a market structure transformation directly to go from A to M.
Indeed, if price discrimination (progressive taxation) can be practised, a state can
achieve equilibrium Z over M. Equilibrium Z gives the largest extent of protection,
reaching a protected population of Nz, which is greater than the equilibrium
under a despotic monopoly, No, the perfect competitive spot market equilibrium,
N*, and the balanced-budget-uniform-head-tax benevolent dictator equilibrium,
Nm. A sophisticated state (as opposed to a primitive state) can increase traditional
military expenditures while substantially lowering variable costs by innovating in
other public areas. This would make the discrepancy between M and Z even
larger. Our framework in this paper will not elaborate on this discrepancy. We
categorically identify both M and Z to be centralized democracies.
A centralized democracy in our framework is definitional. It describes the
property of an evolutionary outcome rather than an administrative method of
running a government. It may or may not entail voting or the “general will”
prescribed in Rousseau’s Social Contract. It does not require individuals to give up
their private preferences, but it does require them to give up their right to execute
violence except for self-protection. Our point is that when a protector is perceived
to be capable of delivering a ruling package, this voluntary choice will be made.
When many individuals commit to the same protector, centralized government
will be the outcome. Feng is an excellent example to illustrate this process, as his
strategy was so much different from that envisioned in either Usher or Olson’s
model, aiming to be neither despotic nor stationary, and thus there is a need to
evaluate it in the context of a different model. Delegating this difficult task to be
attempted as an illustrative model in the appendix, we now turn to additional
facts concerning Feng Yu-Hsiang.
4.1 Feng Yu-Hsiang as a study case of prior contracting
As a man who could have become the fictitious President of China, but lost by a
vote count of 98,20 Feng had a career that is interesting in many ways. From the
20 According to Sheridan, p. 119, “not less than 25,000”was surveyed in1923 byTheWeekly Review,
an English-language weekly published by Americans, on who the Chinese wanted to be the next
President. Sun Yat-Sen had the highest vote 1,315, with Feng Yu-hsiang second at with 1,217 votes.
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Chinese perspective, Feng’s accomplishments were not recognized upon his
defeat of White Wolf. Indeed, Feng himself did not claim in his autobiography
any credit for suppressing White Wolf. In his battle with White Wolf in 1914, Feng
cited much inefficiency in his own army.21 Rather than blessed by an “invisible
hand” as described by Olson, Feng’s military power was bequeathed by the visible
hand of the central government during the Manchu Dynasty. He joined the army
when he was young and worked his way up, at one point leading a regiment of
the central government’s army around the time of the Wuhan Revolt in 1911
(Chang 2007). Feng’s credibility depended on others’ respect for his personality,
his alleged discipline, and moral values, all of which helped recruit additional
soldiers to his army and gain the support of peasants and city dwellers alike.22
Anyone who has studied Mao Tse-tung’s founding of the PRC would note the
importance of a peasant-dominated army. Feng, who was not acquainted with
Mao during the warlord period, revealed aspects of his ability to gain grassroots
approval. Feng recalled in his autobiography that one time when he approached
a village, the whole village came out to welcome him, with many of its young-
sters joining his army. The recruitment of new forces from villages and the
countryside was an important element in expanding the size of any army
(Sheridan, pp. 74–78, p. 112, p. 160).
Feng’s troops were also known to be loyal. A well-known incident occurred in
1918 when he was dismissed by the Peking Government’s Tuan Chi-suen. His 9,500
soldiers jointly swore to fight for Feng only, thus forcing Tuan to withdraw the
dismissal. Likewise, in 1927, prior to Feng’s push eastward, various troops assembled
from the North at Xian under the command of Feng. Although many of them were
poor, with “99 out of 100 [having] broken shoes andworn out clothes,”23 the news of
the Eastern conquest was met with great enthusiasm, as described in a Chinese
book discovered by the first author on his 2007 site visit of Feng’s territory:
21 The publications of the three-volume autobiography of Feng in China (Feng 2002, 2006)
mentioned the war with White Wolf (see Note 1), but the crux of the publication was critical of
Chiang and the KMT and supportive of the Communists. Why was this almost 60-year old
autobiography published at this moment in history? This must be an intriguing question for
Western political scientists and historians. However, we have reason to believe that had Olson
read Feng’s work, he would have withdrawn his point that Feng was a classic example of a
stationary bandit.
22 Feng Yu-hsiang is now included in primary schools study material in the PRC, where he is
seen as a “democracy fighter” rather than a warlord. His disciplined army was highly praised,
even by foreign observers, for the way it occupied a city. A diary written by a preaching minister
from Canada in 1925 revealed that Feng fought outside a city while trying to leave the city itself
undisturbed. Hence, he cared about minimizing civilian losses.
23 Chapter 37 in My Life of Autobiography.
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[On] April 10, 1927, Feng (Kaomingchuan) sent wire across the country, announcing the
East Conquest. The wire was received in the area of Shansi and Honan with great
enthusiasm. Many local farmers and farming associations in Honan have meetings, return-
ing wire to Feng, urging him to depart from Tung Kwan (Tongguan) as soon as possible, as
he will be warmly supported24 (translated from Chinese).
Although not an explicit contract, actions at such a grassroots level amounted to
some form of prior contracting made at that level. In addition, there were quid-
pro-quo contracts between protectors (warlords) at higher levels happening
simultaneously. The following account of how the city of Changde was occupied
can be revealing:
… There was a banker by the name of Wang Chun Yea who issued his [private] money of
several ten thousands; but the bank has a notice stating that the money is not commodity
based. Wang used the private currency to buy rice wholesale in large quantities, transport-
ing them to Hankow (Hankou) by boats, thereby earning other currencies of which he will
issue more of his own currency. His practice was despised by the local people. When I
arrived into the city, I talked to him saying, “Our brothers have arrived at your territory,
when we used the legitimate currency to buy things in town, the changes we got back were
all your currency (not commodity based). How could I use your currency to spend in other
areas outside this territory? Wang laughed, admitting that the issue of private currency was
a method because there were no other methods. He agreed to let my army treasurer to talk
to his army treasurer. He said things can be resolved. Our troops just entered the Honan
province. It was a good idea to avoid conflicts. That was why I go along with this. It turned
out that Wang was quite friendly and accommodating towards our approaching troops
(translated from Chinese) writings by Feng.
Perhaps the most explicit example of a protection fee contract being negotiated
during the warlord years in China can be found in an episode in which Warlord
Wu Pei-Fu asked Feng in 1922 for an initiation protection fee of 800,000 yuan for
the first month and 200,000 yuan for each month thereafter (Sheridan 1966,
p. 114; Chang 2007). This request, although rejected by Feng, provided casual
evidence of the formation of quid-pro-quo negotiations over protection contracts
to shape a market structure of protection in China at the time.
Feng is probably most noted by historians in Taiwan for formally uniting
Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT army in 1926 (Pao, Lee, Ng, p. 193). Events evolving
around the time clearly indicated he was roving, and not stationary. Chang
(2007) described the situation:
After 1922, Feng roved with ups and downs, reaching the northwest part of China in August
1926. 1926 was an important year for Feng in that he changed his thoughts and actions. At
24 冯玉祥率部 北伐过陕洲 “Feng Yu-Hsiang’s Northern Expedition via Xiang County” in
DiChuChongLiao (1990).
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around 1925, he contacted the Communist Party and recruited some Communist Party
members into his army, and also invited Russian consultants to train his army. In March
1926, Feng visited Russia. In August, he returned to China. During the interim, he joined the
KMT and declared his army part of the KMT army. This was when the Communists and KMT
collaborated before the beginning of the Northern Expedition. On September 17, Feng
launched his campaign to join the Northern Expedition. He was appointed in May 1927 to
be [the] Republican Revolutionary Army’s 2nd Army Commander (Translated from Chinese).
The mixed psychology of Feng can perhaps only be studied from his own
autobiographies.25 Although described as a moral and disciplined person in
earlier paragraphs, nowadays, some writings in China found on the internet
have mocked Feng as “someone who would call anybody mother as long as he
could get milk from her”.26 This was so because it was only a few years after he
cast his lot with Chiang Kai-Shek’s army that he broke up with Chiang and was
soundly defeated by the latter in 1930. But the 1927 union of the 2nd Northern
expedition in Cheng Chau clearly was a political landmark, as it signified a
centralization of violence execution, a characteristic of the quid-pro-quo evolu-
tionary process that is described in the framework of this paper.
Feng’s 1927 conquest eastward from Tung Kwan to Cheng Chau, highlighted
by the famous military saga called “Central realignment” (中原会师), constituted
the most successful part of his career. According to a scholarly article written by
a professor in China, the following account of the meeting of the union is
revealing:27
Prior to the meeting of [the] union in Cheng Chau, Feng wired the Wuhan Government,
requesting a monthly military fee of 3 million. [The] Wuhan Government agreed to a
monthly sum of 1.5 million and another 600,000 worth of currency, bond[s], and silver
dollars. After the meeting, Feng asked the Wuhan Government for additional military
machineries… [but was refused]. Thus, Feng changed his focus to Chiang, who took the
opportunity to offer Feng 500,000 on the spot in their meeting at Chui Chau [a city next to
Cheng Chau] and a commitment of [a] 2.5 million monthly military fee (p. 65).
25 Sheridan’s study captured a good part of that, but different interpretations can be derived if
analyzed from the point of view of the first person singular. Sheridan noted: “Feng was from the
outset in complete sympathy with the National Protection Army, but his actions were not
completely consistent with his attitude… having conflicting factors he had to reconcile – his
preference for a cause, his obligation to his superiors, his overriding desire to maintain his
army’s strength and independence” p. 56.
26 In a Chinese academic journal article, Li (2004) 李朝阳 argued that the flip-flop changes in
Feng’s political thoughts was a necessary path towards the new democratic republic of China.
论抗战胜利后冯玉祥政治思想的演变,< 河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)>, Vol. 31, No.4.
27 Su (2004)苏杭 also studied Feng’s political thought process, but revealed features that were
intrinsically economic. 大革命时期冯玉祥的政治倾向, <湖北行政學院學報>武漢: 湖北行政學院
學報編輯部, Vol.13, No.1.
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It is not important that all quid-pro-quo contracts are enforced in order for the
framework described in this paper to hold, as it is not important that all
contracts in market activities should be enforced in order to prove that markets
work. The point that needs to be shown is what is perceived to be enforceable at
the time when negotiations take place. In that respect, the mixed psychology of
Feng at a time when political ideas in China were in a vacuum was under-
standable. The death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 left the constitution of the First
Republic open to interpretation except for Dr. Sun’s will of revolution-an over-
coming of the many years of China’s dynastic history.28
To us, Feng’s mixed psychology is like a consumer shopping for a new car or a
new house; the choice might not be simplistically described as “to buy” or “not to
buy” – perhaps the choice also involves co-purchase, rent with option to buy, etc.
etc. Anyone could have been indecisive. It is precisely this “shopping mentality” of
Feng that can be used to illustrate the concept of individual choices of protection
systems. In this sense, it is mobility that was probably more instrumental in helping
to shape a centralized government in China. Mobility applied on the supply side in
terms of roving bandits and on the demand side in terms of individual migrations.
These questions are certainly worth exploring in high schools and even uni-
versities across China today. In an instructor manual for high school teachers in
China that can be accessed from the internet, we already see teachers soliciting
student discussions in addressing the question of Feng’s uprising against the
Northern Peking Government at the time. Why did Feng invite not only Sun Yat-
sen, but also warlords Tuan and Chang, to Peking?29 High school students in China
now have to discuss this and teachers are encouraged to draw conclusions from
their discussions.
Undoubtedly, what we learned from our study of Feng’s career is that his
legacy was not built upon his encounter with White Wolf. His mystical career
was built upon his initial and final relationship with the Central Chinese
(Warlord) Government at Peking, and, most interestingly, his conversion from
a soldier, to a roving warlord, to a “Christian General”, to an agent for various
warlords and governments, to an army commander in the KMT Government,
and, after his defection, to a Communist sympathiser! Feng died in 1948 when a
fire broke out on board a Soviet ship carrying him across the Black Sea to
28 The famous quote in Sun Yat-sen’s will that almost every Chinese knows is: “Revolution has
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Communist China from the USA via Russia. Neither the Communist nor the KMT
regimes gave the incident much publicity at the time. His life probably would
not have changed the course of Chinese History, but it brought out a prominent
feature of the demand and supply protection model described in this paper – the
role of individual actions and the notion of a higher order of organized violence,
which ultimately led to centralized democracy.
The notion of a centralized democracy here does not imply an economic
philosophy (market vs. command) or a political regime (KMT vs. CCP). Although it
is not the same as the Western notion of a representative democracy, a centralized
democracy resembles a constitutional democracy, since it challenges the concept of
governments as stationary bandits, as suggested by Olson and described in the
econ-political theories in the literature. Even when the protection market had
evolved into a duopoly between the KMT and CCP after the warlord era, the KMT
Government was known to have engaged in war tactics known as “Fortress
Strengthening, Enclosure for Attack” (碉堡圍剿)30 against the Red Army. The
term “fortress strengthening” is particularly reflective, as it coincides with the
stationary aspect of governments. Yet, by 1950, it was the KMT that lost that
stationary foothold to the CCP, which fought the KMT by roving.
5 Projection of the future of modern China
Dynastic China is now history. While no one can say whether history will repeat
itself, Modern China is going through an evolutionary trajectory different from
that envisioned by Usher. Likewise, the distinction between roving and station-
ary bandits did not appear to characterize the emergence of governments appro-
priately in Modern China. Indeed, the conceptual puzzle that Olson pursued in
his quest for a rationale for democracy took a different path of reasoning in the
case of Modern China. Instead of viewing a government as one that evolves to
become a stationary bandit or as a bandit that achieves local autocracy, with a
subsequent theoretical probe of how autocracy can evolve into democracy
(Olson’s chain of thought), this paper suggested an alternative chain of reason-
ing: evolve first from anarchy into a spot market for protection and, through a
dynamic sense of competition, from the spot market to a declining marginal cost
of protection, thereby leading to a centralized democracy. The sense of democ-
racy used in this context is different from the representative democracy as
envisioned by the Greeks, Italians, British, and North Americans. It can be
30 Wong (2006) used the term, citing 郭廷以著 <近代中國史綱> as the reference for it.
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considered in relation to “democracy with Chinese characteristics” but the
concept is general, and is not confined to the Chinese context only.31
The saga of Feng is an interesting story told in the backdrop of a political
environment in which there were no a priori reasons for history to go one way or
another. In the context of the framework discussed in this paper, players’ actions
can be explained ex-post by the parameters of the model. This does not mean
that the model proved anything in the same manner as Mao Zedong’s concept of
centralized democracy proving a theory. Yet, the market structure of protection
described in this paper suggests that the concept of a centralized democracy is
important. Achieving a higher order of organized violence is important. Freedom
of choice is important.32 Centralized democracy as a concept, and perhaps an
ideal one at that, can be supported by a framework that is derived from those
premises based on value and costs. It is a universal proposition and a scientific
one in the sense of the logical steps of reasoning, without specific moral
implications, particularly with respect to the use of force.
From a positive economics perspective, how history has been played out and
how events will unfold in the future can be suggestively phrased in the context of
the model of this paper, depending on how the actors within the model commu-
nicate parameter values to each other. What influences outcomes are the para-
meters, αj and γj, which were perceived at the time when individual choices are
made, be they active or passive. Whether the parameters are (or have been) achiev-
able is a different matter. The internal dynamics within the model could be
adjusted, while parameters could also be adjusted as circumstances change. In
other words, there can be organic internal growth as well as disturbances from
outside the model that can change the adjustment process when the system is
heading towards a particular targeted equilibrium. With such caveats, a few words
can be said about the future unification potential of China:
1. The vast ongoing promotion of exchanges at all levels between Cross-Strait
Three Regions is a good thing. It paves the way for voting with actions, and
is unquestionably a prerequisite that will facilitate the evolution of the
market structure of protection. The freedom of individuals to choose their
protectors is important.
31 The discussion on centralized democracy as a concept in this paper is different from the
discussion of democracy as an administrative method for a government, which is a separate
dimension of the problem in the negotiation over a quid-pro-quo contract. This paper is not
about administrative effectiveness. The possibility of a “quid pro quo” political contract in the
politics of Colombia was also discussed in Acemoglu et al. (2013).
32 This is in line with the first author’s earlier work with Tony Lowenberg (see 1990, 1992a, 1992b).
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2. With declining marginal costs of protection as the hallmark of a centralized
democracy, it would be useful to examine Cross-Strait (Mainland and
Taiwan) proposals regarding how people’s livelihoods would be affected
by a future unified regime. There is a much more acute income inequality
distribution problem for Mainland China than for Taiwan. The former may
need to pledge non-appropriation to the latter, and competing regimes may
need to address the problems of China’s lower income groups in order for
competition between regimes with declining marginal costs to take place.
Without this condition, centralized democracy is unlikely to happen.
3. The existing market structure of protection in China can be characterized by
a duopoly with rising marginal costs of protection. Unification for duopolies
as purely an inter-governmental endeavour without citizen participation will
turn an alleged centralized democracy into a monopoly. While a duopoly is
not as efficient as a centralized democracy, it is more efficient than a
dynastic monopoly.
4. Military integration lowers the total fixed costs in the market for protection,
and is definitely more efficient than an armed race with rising marginal cost
of protection. However, military integration or unification via unilateral
dominance, by threat or by war, to the extent that it affects only the fixed
cost component with no effect on the variable cost of protection, will not
result in a centralized democracy.
6 Conclusion
The reasons for the birth of nations can bemany. According to Ronald Coase (1960),
the government is a “super-firm” (but of a very special kind). Thus a nation arises
very much like a firm arises. There is an untold story of Feng in Olson’s source of
inspiration on dictatorship and democracy in the story of the forming of a super-
firm. Olson reviewed the evolution of governments from roving to stationary ban-
dits, with autocracies and democracies as the puzzles he sought to explain. This
notion of the State reinforced aWeberian concept of State as amonopoly of violence
Weber (1919). Feng played a role in formulating Olson’s thoughts on the matter of
bandits. He fought White Wolf in 1914, but in Olson’s view, he did not contribute
significantly to the theorizing of a transition from autocracy to democracy. This
paper attempted to fill this void by providing additional facts and a framework for
understanding the emergence of a centralized democracy in China. Although
democracy in this sense is not a representative democracy like that in the West,
the motivation for this exercise is distinctively Olsonian: “The moral appeal of
democracy is now almost universally appreciated, but its economic advantages
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are scarcely understood” (p. 575).Within the framework developed in this paper, the
demand and supply of protection, centralized democracy clearly provides the high-
est welfare, total value (summing up one’s willingness to pay) minus total costs over
anarchy or despotic dynasty.
Our paper places primary emphasis on contractual relationships, not only
amount rulers (Suppliers of protection), but more importantly between subjects
and rulers. lndividuals voluntarily agree to relinquish their right to self-defense
by contracting with a local warlord or a ruler for provision of protection services.
The local rulers in turn give up their rights to exercise violence in return for
provision of protection services from higher-level rulers. Through a series of
such contracts for “organized violence”, a centralized demorcracy emerges. The
evolution of higher orders of protection is driven by technological change which
alters the cost parameters of the supply of protection and thus changes the
market structure of protection, initially from atomistic perfect competition (anar-
chy), possibly to despotic monopoly, but ultimately to centralized democracy.
Due to falling marginal costs of protection, a centralized democracy is able to
provide protection to more individuals more efficiently than either spot markets
or local despots.
The emergence of a government in Modern China was shown in this paper to
be a problem beyond “the first blessing of the invisible hand”. Analyses based
on offensive and defensive tactics may be useful for violence execution, but are
less useful as frameworks for understanding how governments evolved.
Understanding the nature of violence and the role of organized violence could
be important in the new formulation discussed in this paper. A contractarian
model in which individual choices and governmental actions intermingle has
been shown to be a more viable framework of interpreting changes that hap-
pened during the warlord period in China. Many implications can be projected
for future studies, this paper provides a few in the context of modern China.
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Appendix
The Demand and Supply of the Protection Market
The model will start from specifying a demand for protection, which is the
willingness to pay for protection. A subject’s sense of security determines
his/her willingness to pay, but we assume here that there is a mindset of
peace and quiet that are inert that can be expressed in terms of willingness
to pay. A subject seeks various forms of protection, as simple as a lock and a
shelter to hide, and as complicated as bodyguards and national defense, all
aiming to give the subject a sense of security. Unlike sporting events, where
the strategy of conflict produces innate consumption value for spectators,
buyers of protection care less about the weapon technologies used except for
the purpose of winning. They only care about the end result – to defeat the
enemy for security and peace of mind, which can be affected positively or
negatively by having a larger number of individuals covered under the same
protection scheme.
We further postulated that the characteristics of this security function to be
the following. The effect of military inputs on security is intrinsically different
from the effect of the number of protected individuals on security. For military
inputs, if the resources devoted to conflict (including attack and defense) are the
same for every protector, a sense of security for everyone is very low, as the
outcome of a conflict is nothing more than the flip of a coin. The more asym-
metric is the weapons technology used by the warriors, the higher the outcome
of security will be, as war would be more unlikely when an outcome is known in
advance. On the other hand, the effects on security of a number of individuals
under protection could be neutral in that when the number increases, it will cost
the attacker more to attack, just as it will cost the defender more to protect. The
difference in resource expenditure on violence could remain the same even
when the number of individuals being protected increases, and thus, the level
of security remains the same even when the number of individuals being
protected increases.
The above characterization of security demand in relationship to violence
(military inputs) leads to the following model specification: A society consists of
N number of individuals wanting protection that are indexed by i and Z number
of violence executing groups (i. e., protectors indexed by j). (N, Z) defines a
domain under analysis, which could be interpreted as a family, a street block, a
city, a country, a region, or the world. Resources devoted to violence by j is
denoted by mj, while the mean violence resource devoted by Z–1 protectors is
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denoted by m.33 The security provided by protector, j, is Sj(mj-m), with Sj′>0. For
simplicity, S was not indexed by i in that a security system provided by j is
assumed to uniformly apply to all clients under its protection. As explained in
the early paragraphs in this section, the total number of clients under protection
also did not enter into this security function.
The willingness of individual, i, to pay for protection by j is denoted by
WTPij.
WTPij =WijðSjðmj −mÞ, Kj αj
 
, eijÞ [1]
The inclusion of a local public good, Kj, as a function of an innovation factor, αj,
and an idiosyncratic factor of individual, i, towards protector j, eij, showed that
one’s willingness to pay can also be affected by a large number of variables that
protector j may control. This factor can be overwhelming, and largely contribute
to a sense of inert sense of security a subject, i, has for a protector j. The
technology of protection is captured by security function, S, which is an out-
come of military inputs of j relative to the military inputs expended by the
average inputs of other executors of violence.
Turning now to the cost side of technology of protection, the framework we
use will separate the cost structure of protection into two components: a fixed
cost component that does not vary and a variable cost component that does vary
with respect to the number of individuals under protection. Letting the number
of individuals protected by j be denoted by xj, we can write the cost function of
protection as TCj:
TCj =Vjðxj, Kj, ..., αj.Þ+Fjðmj, ,m, γjÞ [2]
Note that the variable cost, V, of servicing protection depends on things other
than the technology of attacking and defending. The latter are to be indexed by
γj only in the fixed cost component, F. Innovations in local public goods affect
the variable cost component only and are indexed separately as αj. Examples of
the fixed cost of protection are military expenditures, national defense, and the
cost of maintaining an army. Examples of the variable cost of protection with
respect to the number of people protected are the cost of administering the
protection, tax administration, fiscal financing, and expenditures for local police
and politicians.
33 The military resources of other protectors, m, can also be broadly interpreted as the military
resources of all potential attackers of j. In Dixit’s model, they are resources expended by the
bandits.
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From anarchy to organized violence – a perfectly competitive
market of protection
Many individuals learn to protect themselves. As the art of self-protection is
acquired, a few individuals offer their protection services to others in exchange
for other goods and services that generate utility. The incentive to trade is no
different from that depicted by an Edgeworth-Bowley box, in which individuals
with different levels of tolerance for violence will engage in mutually beneficial
exchanges. We shall call this the 1st degree of organized violence, which is
contingent only upon differences in preferences. The trading of violence can
result in some specializations in violence, allowing the mechanics of violence to
be practised more efficiently, and thus leading to organized violence.
The 1st degree of organized violence has an enforcement issue at the most
fundamental level that is as difficult to resolve as the end period problem in
game theory.34 Yet, in contracts for protection (violence), a higher degree of
organized violence need not resolve the end period problem in order to reach
equilibrium. A specialist of violence may not be able to expropriate all his
clients at the same time. What is more likely is that specialists will expropriate
bit by bit rather than renege on all their clients at the same time. Although for
cultural and whatever reasons, some primitive isolated society may want to
uniformly expropriate the welfare benefits of all the clients who cannot make
choices, the market for protection is contingent upon the assumption that
individuals (and their assets) have some degree of mobility and choice.
Without this assumption, the market for protection is a moot issue. In other
words, a market for protection hypothetically assumes individuals can seek
other competitive producers of violence, which would result when surviving
victims vote with their feet. If buyers of protection can choose alternative
suppliers of protection, this would impose a constraint on expropriation and
equilibrium within a market of protection can exist.
Give the above setup of the problem, anarchy can evolve into a primitive
form (1st order) of organized violence, which would then evolve into a spot
34 The end period problem entails: (1) the contract for protection being reneged on by the
specialist of violence (particularly if s/he becomes more efficient in performing it him/herself)
and (2) other specialists of violence becoming more aggressive in threatening their neighbours.
Olson examined conditions in which an autocracy would voluntarily give up full expropriation
with an independent judiciary review or democracy as an enforcement mechanism. These
commitment issues were examined in the contractarian camp extensively, e. g. North and
Weingast (1989), Kiser and Barzel (1991), Barzel (1992), Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), Fleck
and Hanssen (2006), etc.
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market (perfect competitive market) for protection, which can then be consid-
ered the 2nd order of organized violence. Notice that the spot market structure
implies nothing about the roving or stationary ability of the protectors. All it
requires is that the customer is willing to pay, there are competitive suppliers
willing to protect, and implicit contracts can be honoured.
Theoretically, the above notions can be conceptualized as conditions for
which suppliers of protection offer it to individuals who want it in a competitive
market. Without including the element of innovation, the model is similar to the
demand-supply model in any market except for one thing: competing suppliers
of protection can raise each other’s costs of protection by engaging in violent
conflict. In this spot market of protection, entry will raise, rather than reduce,
costs. The essential features of the equilibrium include:
(1) Rising marginal costs of protection;
(2) free entry in supplying protection; and
(3) violent interactions among suppliers of protection.
We wish to first illustrate this spot market model as a benchmark for further
consideration of (and including) the element of innovation. The benchmark case is
similar to a standard demand and supply model found in economics textbooks:
Demand conditions
Arranging WTPij in descending order according to i constitutes a market demand
for protection, D (see Figure 1 in the text). Among other things that can affect the
demand curve is the security function, S. ∂Wij
∂Sj
is the marginal product of a unit
increase in the security of j on i. The higher is civilian net productivity, the
higher will be this marginal product. In general, we expected the height of the
aggregate demand for protection to shift upward as a society’s productivity (and
the asset wealth) increases. Wealth creation is assumed in this model to be
exogenous. It can be endogenized by further extension. Presumably, the more
security that can be offered, the larger will be the wealth accumulation. More
wealth also induces higher demand for security. We assumed that this reiterative
process would be smaller for each reiteration so that cumulative effects converge
with stability.
Although there are additional angles on the demand for protection that can be
further elaboratedon, themain point in the display of the formulation here is to show
that this demand is not that much different from other demand curves used in
economics for demand analysis in that it has an income effect, and the possibility
of substitution when competing products are made available in the market.
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An individual maximizes consumer surplus by choosing the best protector,
j, which can offer the highest security with the lowest protection fee.
For individual i, he chooses the maximum over all j from bids from all j by
maximizing a net protection benefit, πi where
πi =WTPij −Pj [3]
Pj represents the protection fee (tax) charged by the protector, j.
Supply conditions
We assumed that each protector has two objective functions: 1) to maximize the
probability of winning and 2) to maximize their profits of protection subject to
competition.35





When one specialist (group) expends resources to prepare for violence, the cost
of the other specialists (groups) will also increase. Resources expended by a
specialist of violence, mj, are assumed to be an increasing function of the
expenditures of its competing groups of violence specialists. If the reaction
function has a slope of less than one, Nash equilibrium exists with Sj
*(m*,γj).
A strategic choice of γj can disrupt this equilibrium, but the formulation will not
be explicitly modelled in this paper.
The second objective function a protector faces is the profit function of Pj
charging protection fees to his clients, net of costs.
Thus, for Protector j, the objective function is to maximize
Pj.xj* − TCj [5]
where xj
* is the number of individuals protector j can recruit to be under his
protection umbrella. xj
*can be interpreted as the demand as seen by the protec-






diðPij, Kj; P, KÞ [6]
35 This dual objective re-emphasizes the peculiarity of violence as a form of production
technology discussed earlier. The objective in the game of violence is to overwhelm or win. It
is not an economic decision in which the marginal gain per blow is made to execute an action.
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where di takes on the binary value of zero and 1 depending on if individual, i, signs
up for protection with j.
Total number of people in the population, N, under protection is N*= Sumof xj
*
Market equilibrium
The competitive process so described seems quite complex. However, the
assumptions described in Equations (1) to (6) implicitly assert a sequential
method of competition in the model in that combat between protectors is to be
separated from (and preceding in a conceptual sense) competition in attracting
tax revenues. A protector will engage in an arms race for a winning prize of NOT
tax revenues per se, but more security for whomever and whatever a country is
protecting. The cost of that violence competition will then be included as a fixed
cost in the market of protection. Furthermore, the assumption of the separation
of fixed and variable cost components of protection means that competition in
the arms race would not affect the variable costs of providing other public
goods, resulting in a market equilibrium that is not much different from other
competitive market adjustments. Namely, protectors compete by offering better
security with lower protection fees and local public goods to attract potential
clients, which is similar to that envisioned in the Tiebout Hypothesis, at least in
the case of perfect symmetry in which αj and γj are assumed to be constant and
identical for every protector.36 The equilibrium can be graphically represented
by Figure 1 in the text.
Inclusion of innovation: formation of a centralized government
A society can transform a perfectly competitive market of protection, which is
characterised by the rising cost of protection, into an alternate market structure
of protection. To do so, societal interactions would have to go beyond the first
and second degrees of organized violence. Higher degrees require protectors (and
therefore their clients under protection) to give up their means of executing
violence – a process of centralizing military resources under a centralized
government. One can speculate the process through which this can occur, but
the precise trajectory cannot be easily formulated. For one thing, oligopoly
theory in this direction has not been well-developed, and many real world
examples are still undergoing trials. Moreover, a centralized government has
not been viewed as similar to the problem of democracy in the literature.
36 See Tiebout (1956).
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Therefore, centralized democracy has not been the focus of attention.37 Yet, in
modern Chinese political thought, a centralized democracy is a very important
philosophy even in today’s pro-market PRC government politics.
The framework here is not saying that a centralized democracy will neces-
sarily be the evolutionary outcome of a market structure of protection. Indeed,
the current situation for modern China is still a duopoly, but the framework here
describes the possibility of a tendency for the market structure to move towards
this equilibrium, while admitting that other market structures, including the
dynastic equilibrium examined by Usher, could also be theoretical outcomes.
The choice variables that will enable a centralized democracy to be the market
structure outcome include a current committed price protection scheme, a future
spot market price protection scheme, technological shift parameters of αj and γj
(and their associated costs), and a game theoretical choice of military competi-
tion in the manner described by eq. [4] versus a cooperative solution of getting
out of a prisoner’s dilemma.
Granted that the decision variables of the choice problem are much broader
and much more complicated than what is needed in a perfectly competitive
(atomistic) model, they should not prevent us from conceptualizing the nature of
the choice problem in this dynamic setting. Although to introduce them runs the
risk of underspecifying a model, omitting them can turn a model into one that
addresses an empty issue, at least in the case of Modern China.
We can use additional mathematical symbols to represent each of the
parameters listed above and organize a set of modified equations that describes
this broader dynamic choice problem corresponding to Equations (1) to (5).
However, this process would not provide additional analytical insights in that
we cannot predict, at this stage of our analysis, under what situation will one
type of evolution trajectory necessarily dominate another. We are thus compelled
to discuss the outcome conceptually. Basically, the evolutionary process could
come about through choices made by the individual actions of both the suppli-
ers and demanders of the market of protection.
On the supply side: a protector offers a prior contract for a committed price,
which will reduce the demand for protective services to his competitors, with the
future spot market (uncommitted) size shrinking. His competitor, upon seeing a
possible shrinking future market, will compare a spot pricing tactic with the
37 Democracy, not centralized democracy, was Olson’s inquiry. In addressing the question of
how democracies emerge from autocracies, he provided a default answer: “The theory here
predicts that democracy would be most likely to emerge spontaneously when…individual[s]…
who orchestrated the overthrow of an autocracy could not establish another autocracy…”
(p. 573).
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strategy of following suit to also offer a committed price, which is very much like
a Bertrand competition. The twist here is that the average and variable costs of
protection are also lowered (or anticipated to lower). The incentive of offering
lower committed prices to customers would be much higher if the costs are
expected to go down by an amount larger than the price cut. On the other hand,
if a protector continues to operate in a spot market context only, he will be
alienated (or marginalized) when individuals under his protection switch to an
alternative protector perceived to have a lower cost through αj and a higher
military means of protection, γj
On the demand side: an individual shopping for protection will compare
offered committed prices, the level of security, and the amount of public goods
offered by j (and the expected spot price if uncommitted) and choose whether or
not he wants to commit to a prior contract, and if so, from whom. The larger the
spot price one has to pay for identical security and public goods, the larger is
one’s incentive to accept a lowered committed price. In order to choose a
particular protector, an individual will pick the one who presents the highest
chance of reducing the average and marginal costs of protection (i. e., delivering
what he promises to deliver).
It may be useful to think of this evolution as a contract for innovation and
an institutional choice problem.38 In other words, the evolution can be achieved
through a contract between protected individuals and a protector who promises
to improve his/her protection ability so that the marginal cost of protection
becomes a decreasing cost function in return for the taxes paid by the protected
individuals. This contract can be considered a social contract and a form of
“quid pro quo taxation”.39
We noted that an important precondition of a centralized democracy is a
decreasing marginal cost of protection. Without that, a protector cannot handle
a large population under protection, just as a mom-and-pop street corner restau-
rant will not be able to handle a large patronage. αj is important not only for
shifting the variable cost components of protection, but for making them decline
(i. e., recruiting additional individuals under the same system of protection
lowers the marginal cost of protection).
A decreasing cost of protection, however, is only one precondition for a
centralized democracy. If “consumers” of protection have not made prior
arrangements with a centralized government, and if the latter evolves purely
from the supply side as weapons and/or administrative technology improve, the
protector can turn into a single despot who charges a monopoly price for the
38 See Yu (1981, 1984).
39 Buchanan (1975) made an important contribution to this notion of a constitutional economy.
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protection of MR=MC. Conceptually, a government with a declining average
cost of protection may emerge dictatorially by might or under a democratic
social contract, in which buyers of protection are directly (or indirectly) involved
in government policies. Figure 2 in the text compares the various equilibria in
this technological cost-decreasing environment.
Note in the diagram in the text that a dictator would charge a monopoly rent
(AR–AC)No by equating MC with MR. How this monopoly rent is divided deter-
mines the outcome of the ideal of centralized democracy vs. a despot. S/he may
be a benevolent or enlightened dictator if part of this rent is redistributed to his/
her subjects, but a despot or tyrant if s/he grabs all the rent for him/herself.
Olson “did not” consider this problem, which went from Point O to Point M in
the diagram. Point M denotes a democratic government that aims to charge at
the average cost (i. e., adopt a uniform head tax with balanced budget in the
long run) and earn normal returns with AR=AC. This is one notion of democracy
that is consistent with the notion of constitutional economics.
The mechanism by which equilibrium, M, emerges over equilibrium, O, is
tricky and not easily engineered. The history of the world suggests that it does
not always happen, although there is a great efficiency gain for a society as a
whole to choose M over O, even if it is achieved for only a short period of time.
The condition of M as a stable equilibrium is a theoretical possibility, but it can
also act as an ideal that many governments in the world try to achieve. The
choice problem entails the involvement of individuals: a person can do nothing
and wait to be forced to pay a monopoly protection fee of Po, or commit to the
offer of a lower price of protection, Pm, of an emerging central government.
This appendix basically outlines all political institutional equilibria within a
framework of market of protection without predicting which will necessarily be
the outcome. The framework does imply that transaction costs aside, and from
pure economic efficiency perspective, equilibrium M is clearly the long run
solution. Unfortunately, Feng Yu-Hsiang has not been successful in reaching
that equilibrium. Although he managed γj (technology in affecting fixed costs)
well, he had little to offer in αj (principles affecting the variable costs). Perhaps
that was what contributed to his political failure. Nevertheless, his existence
served being a transitional step, in a very important process on how other
“protectors” in China have tried to reach the equilibrium of a centralized
democracy.
36 B. T. Yu et al.
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